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Abstract
The continuous-time version of Kyle’s [6] model, known as the Back’s
[2] model, of asset pricing with asymmetric information, is studied. A
larger class of price processes and a larger classes of noise traders’ pro-
cesses are studied. The price process, as in Kyle’s [6] model, is allowed
to depend on the path of the market order. The process of the noise
traders’ is considered to be an inhomogeneous Le´vy process. The solu-
tions are found with the use of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations.
With the informed agent being risk-neutral, the price pressure is constant
over time, and there is no equilibirium in the presence of jumps. If the
informed agent is risk-averse, there is no equilibirium in the presence of
either jumps or drift in the process of the noise traders’.
Key words: Market microstructure, insider trading, stochastic con-
trol, Le´vy processes, semimartingales.
JEL-Classification C61· D43· D44· D53· G11· G12· G14
1 Introduction
Models of markets with the presence of an insider, that is to say, a trader who
has some kind of additional information, have a great literature. In the ap-
proaches, we can distinguish two fundamentally different ones. One approach
is considering the market with a bond and some stocks with prices given ex-
ogenously by their dynamics. The other one follows the idea of Kyle [6] where
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the price of the risky asset is led by the demand of the informed trader through
some pricing rule. In the second case, the aim is to find or characterize an equi-
librium where the informed agent maximizes his profits and the prices are set in
a competitive way. In between one can find the model described by Lassere [7],
where a bond and two risky assets are considered, one risky asset with prices
given exogenously and one priced as it is in Kyle [6] (and Back [2]). A more
general model is studied in Lassere [8], where more risky assets are involved.
Following the Kyle-Back approach, Campi and C¸etin [4] find equilibrium in the
market of zero coupon bonds with default, and so does Back [3] in a market with
options. Also the present paper follows the Kyle-Back approach but considers a
time continuous trading where the noise traders’ dynamics are allowed to have
jumps. We study the existence of equilibria in this market model in presence
of an insider taking advantage of asymmetric information, and we also consider
different types of insider attitude to risk: both risk neutral and risk-adverse.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next Section, the model is described
and we formulate the wealth process. In Section 3, one can find an analysis of
equilibrium and of its existence, and in the last Section a conclusion is contained.
2 The Model
We consider a market with two assets: we have a risky asset S and a bank
account with interest rate r equal to zero for the sake of simplicity. The period
in which the participants trade is [0, 1]. There is to be a public release of
information at time 1. The announcement reveals the value of the risky asset,
at which price it will trade afterwards (that is to say, at time 1+). This value is
denoted by V and it is assumed to be a random variable with finite expectation
The market is continuous in time and order driven. There are three kinds of
traders. Noise or liquidity traders, who trade for liquidity or hedging reasons,
the informed trader or insider, who is aware of the privilege information at time
0, and market makers, who set the price and clear the market. All random
variables are defined in a complete probability space (Ω,F ,P) .
Denote the price of the stock at time t by Pt and FP=
(FPt )0≤t≤1 where
FPt = σ(Ps, 0 ≤ s ≤ t). Let Z be the aggregate demand process of the noise
traders. The model we consider is an extension of the one in Back [2], where Z
is a Brownian motion with a fixed volatility, to more general set of processes. In
Aase et al. [1] the authors consider a noise trader’s demand with time-varying
volatility. In this paper we consider processes that may have a drift and jumps,
as well. More precisely we assume that
dZt = µtdt+ σtdBt + dLt, t ∈ [0, 1], Z0 = 0. (1)
where B is a Brownian motion, independent of V , and µ, σ : [0, 1] → R are
deterministic, ca`dla`g functions, and L is an pure jump Le´vy process independent
of V and B. We also assume that the process L can be expressed by
Lt =
∫ t
0
∫
R
xM˜(dt, dx),
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where M˜(dt,dx) = M(dt, dx) − vt(dx)dt is the compensated Poisson random
measure associated with L, and with intensity vt(dx).
Let X be the demand process of the informed trader. At time t, he knows
V , as well as {Ps : 0 ≤ s ≤ t}, thus, X has to be adapted to the augmented
filtration (completed with P-null sets)
FV,P :=
(
FV,Pt
)
0≤t≤1
,
where
FV,Pt := σ(V, Ps, 0 ≤ s ≤ t)
generated by the random variable V and the process P . Because of the indepen-
dency assumed before, B is an FV,Z-Brownian motion and L is an FV,Z-pure
jump Le´vy process as well. The informed trader tries to maximize his final
wealth, that is, he is risk-neutral (one may find a model with risk averse in-
formed traders in Cho [5] and we also study them in Subsection 3.5). Finally,
the market makers ”clear” the market by fixing a competitive or rational price,
given by
Pt = E(V |Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), t ∈ [0, 1]
where Y = X + Z is the total demand that market makers observe. Note that
(Pt) is an FY -martingale, where FY =
(FYt )0≤t≤1 and FYt = σ(Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t).
Here and in the sequel we always consider P-augmented filtrations.
2.1 The wealth process
In the original model of Kyle, the current price depends on the past demand,
while in Back’s one it is supposed to be Markovian, depending only on the
current total demand. Cho [5] shows that Back’s results hold in the original
settings with the current price depending on the whole path. We also consider
this case. Suppose that the market makers fix prices through a pricing rule, in
terms of formulas,
Pt = H(t, ξt), t ∈ [0, 1]
with
ξt :=
∫ t
0
λ(s)dYs
where, the so-called price pressure, λ is a positive smooth function, H ∈ C1,2
and H(t, ·) is strictly increasing for every t ∈ [0, 1]. We also write ξ(t, Yt) for
ξt. Note then that FY = FP and that FV,P = FV,Y = FV,X+Z . So it is natural,
in this context, to assume that X is adapted to the filtration FV,Z , and that
consequently FY ⊆ FV,Z , in such a way that if Xt = f(Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t, V ) for
certain measurable function f we can write Xt = g(Zs, 0 ≤ s ≤ t, V ) for another
measurable function g.
Definition 1 Denote the class of such pairs (H,λ) above by H. An element
of H is called a pricing rule.
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As shown in Back [2] and Cho [5], in equilibrium, the optimal strategies are
of the form
dXt = θtdt. (2)
Definition 2 Denote, by X , the set of FV,Z-adapted processes X satisfying (2)
and such that ∀ (H,λ) ∈ H
E
(∫ 1
0
σ2tU
(
t,
∫ t
0
λsd (Xs + Zs)
)2)
dt<∞ (3)
∫ 1
0
∫
R
u2E
(
U
(
t,
∫ t
0
λsd (Xs + Zs) + λtu
)2)
νt(du)dt<∞ (4)
for both cases U = H and U = ∂∂yH. The elements of X are called the strategies.
We assume that X ≡ 0 is a strategy in X .
Later, in Subsection 3.2, we will see that this class can be extended to the
one considered in Back [2].
The final wealth W of the insider, just after the announcement, is computed
as follows. Consider first a discrete model where trades are made at times
i = 1, 2, . . . N . If at time i− 1, there is an order of buying Xi−Xi−1 shares, its
cost will be Pi(Xi −Xi−1), so, there is a change in the bank account given by
−Pi(Xi −Xi−1).
Then the total change is
−
N∑
i=1
Pi(Xi −Xi−1),
and due to the announcement, just after the final time N , by the liquidation of
the assets, there is the extra income: XNV . So, the total wealth generated is
WN+ = −
N∑
i=1
Pi(Xi −Xi−1) +XNV
= −
N∑
i=1
Pi−1(Xi −Xi−1)−
N∑
i=1
(Pi − Pi−1)(Xi −Xi−1) +XNV
=
N∑
i=1
(V − Pi−1)(Xi −Xi−1)−
N∑
i=1
(Pi − Pi−1)(Xi −Xi−1),
where, without loss of generality, we assume X0 = 0. Analogously, in the
continuous model,
W1+ =
∫ 1
0
(V − Pt−)dXt − [P,X]1, (5)
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where (and throughout the whole article) Xt− denotes the left limit lims↑tXs.
We require that X is an FV,P -semimartingale, so that the integral can be seen
as an Itoˆ integral, and to ensure the quadratic covariation [P,X] is finite we
also assume that P is an FV,P -semimartingale.
As mentioned before, in equilibrium the market makers fix the pricing rule in
a rational way and the insider tries to maximize his expected profit. Formally,
Definition 3 Given a trading strategy X (and total demand Y = X + Z), the
price process P is rational, if
Pt = E(V |Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t), t ∈ [0, 1]
Definition 4 A strategy X is called optimal with respect to a price process P
if it maximizes E(W1+).
And if both hold, we have an equilibrium. We are looking for an equilibrium
only in the class of pricing rules satisfying Definition 1.
Definition 5 Let (H,λ) ∈ H and X ∈ X . The triple (H,λ,X) is an equi-
librium, if the price process P· := H(·, ξ(·, Y )) is rational, given X, and the
strategy X is optimal, given P .
3 Equilibrium
As done in Back [2] and Cho [5], we look for an equilibrium and characterize
it by using the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation, as follows. First, we find
the equation corresponding to our problem and give a solution to it. Then,
we show that there is no loss of generality by assuming (2), and present some
properties of rational pricing rules. Finally, we show that when considering the
noise traders’ demand process (1), there is no equilibrium in the presence of
jumps. Moreover if we consider a risk-averse informed trader we may find an
equilibrium only if there is neither drift, nor jump part in the noise traders’
process, thus it leads back to the problem and solution one can found in Cho
[5].
3.1 Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation
Let W be the portfolio wealth of the insider, by (2) and (5)
W1+ =
∫ 1
0
(V − Pt)θtdt.
Define the conditional value function as
J(V, t, y) := sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[∫ 1
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt ] ,
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where θ˜l is FP,Vl -measurable, note that we assume that E
[∫ 1
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
∣∣∣FZ,Vt ]
is a measurable function of ξ(t, θ˜) :=
∫ t
0
λldY
θ˜
l , where Y
θ˜
t = Zt +
∫ t
0
θ˜ldl. Ac-
cording with our framework we work with a pricing rule giving rational prices,
i.e., Pl = E [V |Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ l ] = H(l, ξ(l, θ˜)). So, the conditional value function
can be written as
J(V, t, y) = sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[∫ 1
t
(V −H(l, ξ(l, θ˜))θ˜ldl
∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt ] .
The expected final wealth is J(V, 0, 0).
Theorem 6 Consider an equilibrium with strategy X ∈ X for some FZ,P -
measurable process θ, and the pricing rule (H,λ) ∈ H. If J(V, t, y) ≡ J(t, y) is
smooth then it is a solution of
λt
∂J
∂y
(t, y) = H(t, y)− V ∀(t, y) ∈ (0, 1]× R, (6)
and, for all (t, y) ∈ (0, 1)× R, we have
0 =
∂J
∂t
+ λtµt
∂J
∂y
+
1
2
λ2tσ
2
t
∂2J
∂y2
+
∫
R
(
J (t, y + λtu)− J (t, y)− uλt ∂J
∂y
(t, y)
)
νt (du) , (7)
By J(V, t, y) being smooth we understand that it has to be continuously differ-
entiable in the second variable t on (0, 1) and twice continuously differentiable
in the third variable y on R.
Proof. We have that
J(t, y) = sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[∫ 1
t
(V −H(l, ξ(l, θ˜))θ˜ldl
∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt ] .
Then, by splitting the integral at t+ h ∈ (t, 1) we get
J(t, y) = sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[∫ t+h
t
(V −H(l, ξ(l, θ˜)))θ˜ldl
+
∫ 1
t+h
(V −H(l, ξ(l, θ˜)))θ˜ldl
∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt ] .
Now
J(t, y) = sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[∫ t+h
t
(V −H(l, ξ(l, θ˜)))θ˜ldl
+ sup
θˆ:ξ(t+h,θˆ)=ξ(t+h,θ˜)
E
(∫ 1
t+h
(V −H(l, ξ(l, θˆ)))θˆldl
∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt+h)
∣∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt
]
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hence, we can substitute the second term by J(V, t+h, ξ(t+h, θ˜)) and we have
J(t, y) = sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[∫ t+h
t
(V −H(l, ξ(l, θ˜)))θ˜ldl + J(t+ h, ξ(t+ h, θ˜))
∣∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt
]
.
By subtracting the left hand side of the equation from both sides, we obtain the
following expression under expectation operator∫ t+h
t
(
V −H(l, ξ(l, θ˜))
)
θ˜ldl + J(t+ h, ξ(t+ h, θ˜))− J(t, ξ(t, θ˜)).
Since dXt = θ˜tdt, and
dξ(t, θ˜) = λtdYt = λt(θ˜tdt+ dZt) = λtθ˜tdt+ λtµtdt+ λtσtdBt + λtdLt, (8)
by the smoothness of J , Itoˆ’s formula for J in ξ(t, θ˜) says
J(t+ h, ξ(t+ h, θ˜)) = J(t, ξ(t, θ˜))
+
∫ t+h
t
[
∂J
∂t
(s, ξ(s, θ˜)) +
1
2
λ2sσ
2
s
∂2J
∂y2
(s, ξ(s, θ˜))
]
ds
+
∫ t+h
t
∂J
∂y
(s, ξ(s−, θ˜))dξ(s, θ˜)
+
∑
t≤s≤t+h
[
∆J(s, ξ(s, θ˜))− ∂J
∂y
(s, ξ(s−, θ˜))∆ξ(s, θ˜)
]
,
Then, taking into account (8), we obtain
J(t+ h, ξ(t+ h, θ˜)) = J(t, ξ(t, θ˜))
+
∫ t+h
t
[
∂J
∂t
+ λs(µs + θs)
∂J
∂y
+
1
2
λ2sσ
2
s
∂2J
∂y2
]
ds
+
∫ t+h
t
λsσs
∂J
∂y
dBs +
∫ t+h
t
λs
∂J
∂y
dLs
+
∑
t≤s≤t+h
[
∆J(s, ξ(s, θ˜))− ∂J
∂y
∆ξ(s, θ˜)
]
.
Since ∆ξ(t, θ˜) = λs∆Ys = λs∆Zs, we have
E
 ∑
t≤s≤t+h
∆J(s, ξ(s, θ˜))− ∂J
∂y
∆ξ(s, θ˜)
∣∣∣∣∣∣FP,Vt

= E
 ∑
t≤s≤t+h
J
(
s, ξ(s−, θ˜) + λs∆Zs
)
− J
(
s, ξ(s−, θ˜)
)
− λs∆Zs
∣∣∣∣∣∣FP,Vt

=
∫ t+h
t
∫
R
E
[
J(s, ξs− + λsu)− J(s, ξs−)− uλs ∂J
∂y
∣∣∣FP,Vt ] νs(du)ds.
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Therefore, we obtain the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
0 = sup
θ
{
(V −H)θt + ∂J
∂t
+ λtθt
∂J
∂y
+ λtµt
∂J
∂y
+
1
2
λ2tσ
2
t
∂2J
∂y2
+
∫
R
(J(t, y + λtu)− J(t, y)− uλt ∂J
∂y
(t, y))νt(du)
}
Note, that since the HJB Equation is linear in θ, its coefficient has to equal 0,
otherwise there cannot be a finite maximum. Thus, we obtain (7) and (6) where
the t = 1 case follows from the continuity of ∂J∂y and H.
The following lemma will play an important role later.
Lemma 7 Assume that a process G is FY -adapted and
Gt = Mt +
∫ t
0
αsds,
where M is an FZ,V -martingale and α is FZ,V -adapted and such that for all
t ≥ 0, ∫ t
0
E (|αs|) ds < ∞. Let H be a filtration such that FY ⊆ H ⊆ FZ,V .
Then
Gt = Nt +
∫ t
0
E [αs |Hs ] ds,
where N is an H-martingale.
Proof. First, we show that E [Mt |Ht ] is an H-martingale. Let s ≤ t ≤ 1,
then since Hs ⊆ FZ,Vs
E [E [Mt |Ht ]|Hs] = E [Mt |Hs ] = E
[
E
[
Mt
∣∣FZ,Vs ]∣∣Hs] = E [Ms |Hs ] ,
since M is an FP,V -martingale. Then, consider
Gt −Gs = Mt −Ms +
∫ t
s
αudu.
We have
E [Gt −Gs|Hs] = E [Mt −Ms|Hs] +
∫ t
s
E [αu|Hs] du
= E
[∫ t
s
E [αu|Hu] du
∣∣∣∣Hs] ,
so
E
[
Gt −Gs −
∫ t
s
E [αu|Hu] du
∣∣∣∣Hs] = 0,
hence, Nt := Gt −
∫ t
0
E [αu|Hu] du is an H-martingale.
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Proposition 8 Let (H,λ) be a pricing rule of class H that satisfies
0 =
∂H
∂t
+ λtµt
∂H
∂y
+
1
2
λ2tσ
2
t
∂2H
∂y2
+
∫
R
(
H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y)− uλt ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
)
νt (du) . (9)
and X =
∫ ·
0
θsds a strategy in X . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
i) The process (H(t, ξt)) is an FY -martingale.
ii) E
[
θt| FYt
]
= 0, and
iii) The process
(
Yt −
∫ t
0
µsds
)
is an FY -martingale.
Proof. Let (H,λ) be a pricing rule, then Itoˆ’s formula says
H(t, ξt) = H (0, 0) +
∫ t
0
λsθs
∂H
∂y
(s, ξs) ds
+
∫ t
0
[
∂H
∂t
(s, ξs) +
∂H
∂y
(s, ξs)λsµs +
1
2
λ2sσ
2
s
∂2H
∂y2
(s, ξs)
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
∂H
∂y
(s, ξs−) (λsσsdBs + λsdLs)
+
∑
0≤s≤t
[
∆H(s, ξs)− ∂H
∂y
(s, ξs−)∆ξs
]
= Mt +
∫ t
0
[
∂H
∂t
(s, ξs) + λsµs
∂H
∂y
(s, ξs) +
1
2
λ2sσ
2
s
∂2H
∂y2
(s, ξs)
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
(H(s, ξs− + λsu)−H(s, ξs−)− uλs ∂H
∂y
(s, ξs−))νs(du)ds
+
∫ t
0
λsθs
∂H
∂y
(s, ξs) ds.
where M is an FZ,V -martingale. Then, by Lemma 7 we know that H can be
rewritten as
H(t, ξt) = Nt +
∫ t
0
[
∂H
∂t
(s, ξs) +
∂H
∂y
(s, ξs)λsµs +
1
2
λ2sσ
2
s
∂2H
∂y2
(s, ξs)
]
ds
+
∫ t
0
(H(s, ξs− + λsu)−H(s, ξs−)− uλs ∂H
∂y
(s, ξs−))νs(du)ds
+
∫ t
0
λsE(θs|FYs )
∂H
∂y
(s, ξs) s
= Nt +
∫ t
0
λsE(θs|FYs )
∂H
∂y
(s, ξs) ds,
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where N is an FY -martingale. Then, (H(t, ξt)) is an FY -martingale if and only
if
E(θs|FYs ) = 0,
which proves that i) and ii) are equivalent. Also, we know that
Yt = Zt +
∫ t
0
θsds,
so
Yt −
∫ t
0
µsds = Rt +
∫ t
0
θsds,
where R is an FZ,V -martingale. Then we can write, by Proposition 7,
Yt −
∫ t
0
µsds = Ut +
∫ t
0
E(θs|FYs )ds
where U is an FY -martingale which proves that ii) and iii) are equivalent.
In Back [2], it is proved that, in equilibrium, the pricing rule is of the form
H(t, ξ) = E [H (1, ξ + ξ1 − ξt)] .
In Cho [5], we find that in equilibrium, the price pressure λ is constant and the
pricing rule is of the same form, and gives a solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations with the same construction as in Back [2]. The following
proposition shows that certain properties hold in our case, as well.
Proposition 9 Suppose that for (H,λ) there exist a smooth solution J such
that (H,λ, J) is a solution of (6) and (7), then the price pressure λt is constant
and the pricing rule is of the form
H(t, y) = E [H(1, y + λ(Z1 − Zt)] . (10)
Conversely, if the price pressure is constant, and H satisfies (9), then (H, , J)
with J defined by
J (t, y) = E [J(1, y + λ(Z1 − Zt))] ,
J (1, ·) =
∫ H−1(1,λ·)(V )
·
V −H (1, x)
λ
dx
(where the expectation is taken over Z1 − Zt and V is regarded as a constant)
is a solution of (6), (7) with the boundary condition
J(1, H−1 (1, λ·)(V )) = 0. (11)
Proof. By differentiating first in (6) with respect to t, and then in (7)
with respect to y and combining the results, we get the following equation for
H
0 =
∂H
∂t
+ λtµt
∂H
∂y
+
1
2
λ2tσ
2
t
∂2H
∂y2
+ (V −H) λ
′
t
λt
+
∫
R
(
H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y)− uλt ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
)
νt (du) . (12)
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Then since H (t, y) does not depend on V , we have that λ′t ≡ 0. By Itoˆ’s formula
applied to H(t, λZt), we obtain
H(t, y) = E [H (1, λZ1)|λZt = y] .
Suppose the price pressure is a constant λ, and (H,λ) satisfies (9) and J is
given as assumed above. Then,
Jy(t, y) = − 1
λ
(V − E [H(1, λZ1)|λZt = y]) = −V −H (t, y)
λ
,
which shows that (H,λ, J) satisfies (6). Equation (7) follows from Feynman-
Kac’s formula, as used above. The boundary condition (11) is straightforwardly
verified.
3.2 Optimality in a larger class of strategies
In this subsection, we see in what extent there is loss of generality by considering
strategies of the form (2). In fact, we do not need to assume in advance that
the trading strategy is of the form (2). However we conclude that the optimal
strategies are continuous and with bounded variation. We also see that, provided
we have a solution of the (6) and (7), the maximum expected profit, given V ,
is J(V, 0, 0). So, the following theorem is also a verification theorem.
Theorem 10 If there exists (H,λ, J) satisfying (6), (7) with (H,λ) ∈ H, then
for any solution and any strategy X, semimartingale with respect to FZ,V , the
informed trader’s maximum expected profit, for fixed V, equals J(V, 0, 0). More-
over this maximum value can be reached by X if and only if it satisfies the
following properties:
(i) X has continuous paths,
(ii) the Doob’s decomposition of X does not have martingale part,
(iii) the strategy drives the price to V , that is lim
t→1
Pt = V.
If at least one of these properties does not hold for X, then it is not optimal.
Proof. Having this J ≥ 0 solution of (6) and (7) we are trying to maximize
the expected final wealth
E
[∫ 1
0
(V − Pt−) dXt − [P,X]1
]
. (13)
Denote, as before, Pt = H(t, ξt), the price set by the market makers at time
t, and V the insider’s information, and ξt :=
∫ t
0
λsdYs. We write J(V, t, ξt) ≡
J(t, ξt). By using Itoˆ’s formula, we have
J(1, ξ1) = J(0, ξ0) +
∫ 1
0
∂J
∂y
(t, ξt−)dξt +
∫ 1
0
∂J
∂t
(t, ξt−)dt
+
1
2
∫ 1
0
∂2J
∂y2
(t, ξt−)d[ξc, ξc]t +
∑
0≤t≤1
(
∆J(t, ξt)− ∂J
∂y
(t, ξt−)∆ξt
)
.
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By construction, ξ0 = 0, and we have dξt = λtdYt
d[ξc, ξc]t = λ2td[X
c, Xc]t + 2λ2td[X
c, Zc]t + λ2tσ
2
t dt,
so using (6), (7), we get
J(1, ξ1) = J(0, 0) +
∫ 1
0
(Pt− − V )(dXt + σtdBt + dLt)
+
1
2
∫ 1
0
∂2J
∂y2
(t, ξt−)λ2td[X
c, Xc]t
+
∫ 1
0
∂2J
∂y2
(t, ξt−)λ2td[X
c, Zc] +
∑
0≤t≤1
(
∆J(t, ξt)− ∂J
∂y
(t, ξt−)∆ξt
)
−
∫ 1
0
∫
R
(J(t, ξt− + λtu)− J(t, ξt−)− ∂J
∂y
u)νt(du)dt
Subtracting [P,X]1 from both sides and substituting, we obtain∫ 1
0
(V − Pt−)dXt − [P,X]1 − J(0, 0)
= −J(1, ξ1) +
∫ 1
0
(Pt− − V )(σtdBt + dLt)
+
1
2
∫ 1
0
∂2J
∂y2
(t, ξt−)λ2td[X
c, Xc]t +
∫ 1
0
∂2J
∂y2
(t, ξt−)λ2td[X
c, Zc]t
+
∑
0≤t≤1
(
∆J(t, ξt)− ∂J
∂y
∆ξt
)
−
∫ 1
0
∫
R
(J(t, ξt− + λtu)− J(t, ξt−)− u∂J
∂y
(t, ξt−))λtνt(du)dt− [P,X]1.
We will show that the expectation of the left hand side is non-positive by eval-
uating the right hand side. Note that
[P,X]1 ≡ [P c, Xc]1 +
∑
0≤t≤1
∆Pt∆Xt.
Itoˆ’s formula for H shows that the continuous local martingale part of P is∫
∂H
∂y (t, ξt−)dξ
c
t , so by using (6), we obtain
[P c, Xc]1 =
[∫
∂H
∂y
(t, ξt−)dξct , X
c
]
1
=
∫ 1
0
∂H
∂y
(t, ξt−)d [ξc, Xc]t
=
∫ 1
0
∂2J
∂y2
(t, ξt−)λ2td [X
c, Xc]t +
∫ 1
0
∂2J
∂y2
(t, ξt−)λ2td [X
c, Zc]t ,
and also
λt
∂J
∂y
(t, ξt−)∆Xt + ∆Pt∆Xt = (Pt− − V )∆Xt + ∆Pt∆Xt
= (Pt − V )∆Xt = λt ∂J
∂y
(t, ξt)∆Xt.
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Substituting them for [P,X]t in the right hand side of equation, it simplifies to
−J(1, ξ1) +
∫ 1
0
(Pt− − V )(σtdBt + dLt)− 12
∫ 1
0
∂2J
∂y2
(t, ξt−)d[Xc, Xc]t
+
∑
0≤t≤1
(
J(t, ξt)− J(t, ξt− + λt∆Zt)− λt ∂J
∂y
(t, ξt)∆Xt
)
+
∑
0≤t≤1
(
∆J(t, ξt− + λt∆Zt)− λt ∂J
∂y
(t, ξt−)∆Zt
)
−
∫ 1
0
∫
R
(J(t, ξt− + λtu)− J(t, ξt−)− λt ∂J
∂y
u)νt(du)dt.
1. By definition
J(1, y) = lim
t→1
J(t, y) ≥ 0
because J(·, y) is smooth and
J(t, y) = sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[∫ 1
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
∣∣∣∣FP,Vt ] ≥ 0
so, we have that −J(1, y) ≤ 0, for every y then J(1, ξ1) = 0 if and only if
λ1
∂J
∂y
(1, ξ1) = H(1, ξ1)− V = 0.
2. By conditions (3) and (4) the processes
∫ ·
0
(Pt− − V )(σtdBt + dLt) and
+
∑
0≤t≤·
(
∆J(t, ξt− + λt∆Zt)− ∂J
∂y
(t, ξt−)∆Zt
)
−
∫ ·
0
∫
R
(J(t, ξt− + λtu)− J(t, ξt−)− ∂J
∂y
λtu)νt(du)dt,
are FP,V -martingales, so they vanish when we take expectations.
3. By (6) and H being increasing monotone, we have that Jy is increasing,
hence Jyy > 0, and the measure d[Xc, Xc] ≥ 0,
4. Jyy > 0 (convexity) implies that
J(t, x+ h)− J(t, x+ h1)− ∂J
∂y
(t, x+ h)(h− h1) ≤ 0.
So,∑
0≤t≤1
(
J(t, ξt− + λt∆Yt)− J(t, ξt− + λt∆Zt)− ∂J
∂y
(t, ξt)λt∆Xt
)
≤ 0,
and has its maximum if and only if ∆Yt = ∆Zt, that is if and only if X is
continuous.
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3.3 Rationality
If (H,λ) is a solution of (6) and (7), then, by applying the Itoˆ formula, we
have that
(
H(t,
∫ t
0
λsdZs)
)
is a square-integrable martingale. Then, without
the presence of the insider, the price process follows a martingale. With his
presence we want
(
H(t,
∫ t
0
λsdYs)
)
to remain a martingale, since, as we will
see, this implies that the pricing rule is rational, that is
H(t, ξt) = E
[
V |FYt
]
.
In fact, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 11 Suppose, H ∈ H is a solution of (6)and (7) and X ∈ X
optimal such that E
[
θt| FYt
]
= 0, then the pricing rule is rational, that is
H(t, ξt) = E[V |FYt ], 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
and (H,X) is an equilibrium.
Proof. By Proposition 8, H(t, ξt) is an FY -martingale. Then
H(t, ξt) = E(H(1, ξ1)|FYt )
and since X is optimal, H(1, ξ1) = V.
3.4 Existence of equilibrium
From Theorem 10 we have seen that necessary and sufficient conditions to have
an equilibrium are:
i) to have a price function H ∈ H satisfying the equation (9)
ii) to have a strategy
∫ ·
0
θsds ∈ X satisfying the following conditions:
1. the process
(
Yt −
∫ t
0
µsds
)
is an FY -martingale, where Yt =
∫ t
0
θsds+ Zt
is the total demand.
2. it drives the total demand to the value R := H−1 (1, λ·) (V ) , that is
Y1 = R.
Theorem 12 If the demand of the liquidity traders Z has a jump component
(i.e. L 6= 0), then there is not equilibrium.
Proof. Let Y be the total demand in an equilibrium, then we have
Mt := Yt −
∫ t
0
µsds =
∫ t
0
σsdBs + Lt +
∫ t
0
θs(Y1;Yu, 0 ≤ u ≤ s)ds, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1
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so the r.h.s. is the Doob-Meyer decomposition of the FY -martingale M in
the filtration FY,Y1 , since
∫ ·
0
σsdBs + L· is an FY,Y1-martingale. Now, we can
decompose the martingale M in its continuous and jump components,
M ct =
∫ t
0
σsdBs + Γt,
Mdt = Lt + Λt.
These above are the FY,Y1 -Doob-Meyer decompositions of M c and Md respec-
tively, with Γt + Λt =
∫ t
0
θs(Y1;Yu, 0 ≤ u ≤ s)ds. Note that we have
Mdt − Lt =
∫ t
0
∫
R
x (δ(ds,dx)− υt(dx)ds) = Λt,
where
(∫ t
0
∫
R xδ(ds,dx)
)
is the FY -predictable compensator of the integer ran-
dom measure in the process Md. So Λ is FY -predictable and does not depend
on Y1. Moreover Mdt − Lt is an FY -martingale and consequently Λ ≡ 0, a.s..
So, if there is only jump part in the demand of liquidity traders, i.e. Z ≡
L Mt = Yt = Lt and R = L1 contradicting the hypothesis of independence
between L and R. Therefore there is not equilibrium.
If, on the contrary, we have a continuous part in Z then the argument above
yields
M ct =
∫ t
0
σsdBs +
∫ t
0
θs(Y1;Yu, 0 ≤ u ≤ s)ds, (14)
and
Mdt = Lt.
Note that, since B is independent of L, (14) is the Doob-Meyer decomposition
of M c in the filtration (σ(Y1;Yu, 0 ≤ u ≤ s;Lu, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1)) .
From ii.2 we know that to have optimality we need M c1 = R−L1−
∫ 1
0
µsds.
So, we need to find the Doob-Meyer decomposition of M c· in the insider’s filtra-
tion which is
(σ(Y1, Ys, 0 ≤ s ≤ t)) = (σ(M c1 + L1 − Lt,Ms, 0 ≤ s ≤ t)) .
By the Dambis-Dubins-Schwarz theorem (see Revuz and Yor [9], Thm. V.1.6.
and Prop.V.1.11), M ct ∼
∫ t
0
σsdB˜s for certain Brownian motion B˜ and then, by
using Lemma (7), we have that, in the filtration (σ(M c1 ;M
c
u, 0 ≤ u ≤ s;Lu, 0 ≤ u ≤ 1)),
the Doob-Meyer decomposition is given by
M ct =
∫ t
0
σsdBˆs +
∫ t
0
M c1 −M cs∫ 1
s
σ2udu
σ2sds
where Bˆ is a Brownian motion independent of M c1 and L. Now, again by Lemma
(7), we have that the decomposition in the filtration (σ(M c1 + L1 − Lt,Ms, 0 ≤ s ≤ t))
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is given by
M ct =
∫ t
0
σsdB¯s +
∫ t
0
E(M c1 |M c1 + L1 − Ls;Mu; 0 ≤ u ≤ s)−M cs∫ 1
s
σ2udu
σ2sds,
where B¯ is a Brownian motion. But B¯ depends on M c1 = R−L1−
∫ 1
0
µsds and
then on R, since L1 is independent of the Brownian part by hypothesis. This
contradicts the hypothesis of independence of the noise demand process and
the privileged information. In fact, if B¯ was independent of M c1 , the following
situation would follows: since, for all 0 ≤ t ≤ 1∫ t
0
σsdBˆs +
∫ t
0
M c1 − E(M c1 |M c1 + L1 − Ls;Mu; 0 ≤ u ≤ s)∫ 1
s
σ2udu
σsds =
∫ t
0
σsdB¯s,
and by the symmetry between B¯ and Bˆ, we would have that
∫ ·
0
σsdBˆs and
consequently
∫ ·
0
σsdBˆs −
∫ ·
0
σsdB¯s would be FM
c,Mc1 -martingales, thus M c1 −
E(M c1 |M c1 + L1 − Ls;Mu; 0 ≤ u ≤ s) = 0, a.e.. But this would imply in
particular that
L1 = E(L1|M c1 + L1) = E(L1|R)
contradicting the hypothesis that L is independent of R.
So, in any case of Z with and without continuous component we obtain that
L cannot be independent of R if we want to have rational prices. Hence there
is not equilibrium.
Proposition 13 If the demand of the liquidity traders, Z, has not a jump com-
ponent, then the equilibrium strategy is such that
θt =
Y1 − Yt −
∫ 1
t
µsds∫ 1
t
σ2sds
σ2t
Proof. If Y¯t := Yt −
∫ t
0
µsds =
∫ t
0
σsdB˜s, where B˜ is a Brownian motion,
then
Y¯t −
∫ t
0
Y¯1 − Y¯t∫ 1
s
σ2udu
σ2sds, 0 ≤ t ≤ 1,
is a process identical in law to
∫ ·
0
σsdB˜s and independent of Y1.
3.5 When the insider is risk averse
In this section we study the case of a risk-averse insider. We restrict ourselves
to the case of exponential utility. Assume that the insider wants to maximize
E(u (W1+)) = E(γeγW1+), where γ < 0. Then the value function is given by
J(t, y) := sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[
γ exp
{
γ
∫ 1
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
}∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt ] ,
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and adding and subtracting γ exp γ
∫ 1
t+h
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl under the expectation, we
have
J(t, y) = sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[
γ exp
{
γ
∫ 1
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
}(
1− exp
{
−γ
∫ t+h
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
})
+γ exp
{
γ
∫ 1
t+h
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
}∣∣∣∣FZ,Vt ] ,
= sup
θ˜:ξ(t,θ˜)=y
E
[
γ exp
{
γ
∫ 1
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
}(
1− exp
{
−γ
∫ t+h
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
})
+J(t+ h, ξ(t+ h, θ˜))
∣∣∣FZ,Vt ] .
So, as done in the risk-neutral case, subtracting J(t, y), we can apply Itoˆ’s
formula to the difference J(t+h, ξ(t+h, θ˜))− J(t, ξ(t, θ˜)). Moreover note that,
as h tends to zero, the limit of(
1− exp
{
−γ ∫ t+h
t
(V − Pl)θ˜ldl
})
h
is γ(V − Pt)θ˜t. Hence, we get the following HJB equations,where of course
Pt = H(t, ξt).
0 = sup
θ
{
Jγ(V −H)θt + ∂J
∂t
+ λtθt
∂J
∂y
+
∂J
∂y
λtµt +
1
2
λ2tσ
2
t
∂2J
∂y2
+
∫
R
(J(t, y + λtu)− J(t, y)− uλt ∂J
∂y
(t, y))νt(du)
}
.
Since the equation is linear in θ, we get the following two equations similar to
the risk-neutral case:
λt
∂J
∂y
(t, y) = J (t, y) γ (H(t, y)− V ) ∀(t, y) ∈ (0, 1]× R, (15)
and for all (t, y) ∈ (0, 1)× R
0 =
∂J
∂t
+ λtµt
∂J
∂y
+
1
2
λ2tσ
2
t
∂2J
∂y2
+
∫
R
(
J (t, y + λtu)− J (t, y)− uλt ∂J
∂y
(t, y)
)
νt (du) . (16)
Differentiating (15) by y we have
∂2J
∂y2
=
1
λ2t
Jγ
[
λt
∂H
∂y
+ (H − V )2 γ
]
,
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which plugged in to (16) implies
0 =
∂J
∂t
+ (H − V ) γJµt + 12Jγσ
2
t
[
λt
∂J
∂y
+ (H − V )2 γ
]
+
∫
R
(
J (t, y + λtu)− J (t, y)− uλt ∂J
∂y
(t, y)
)
νt (du) . (17)
Denote
∫
R
(
J (t, y + λtu)− J (t, y)− uλt ∂J∂y (t, y)
)
νt (du) by I(t, y). By differ-
entiating the previous equation by y, we get
0 =
∂J
∂t∂y
+
∂H
∂y
γJµt +
(H − V )2 γ2Jµt
λt
+
1
2
γσ2t
{
(H − V ) γJ
λt
[
λt
∂H
∂y
+ (H − V )2 γ
]
+ J
[
λt
∂2H
∂y2
+ 2 (H − V ) ∂H
∂y
γ
]}
+Iy(t, y), (18)
so
∂J
∂t∂y
= −Jγµt
(
∂H
∂y
+
(V −H)2 γ
λt
)
+J
γσ2t
2
(
3γ (V −H) ∂H
∂y
+
γ2
λt
(V −H)3 − λt ∂
2H
∂y2
)
− Iy(t, y).
While differentiating (15) by t, we get
λ′t
∂J
∂y
+
∂J
∂t∂y
λt =
∂H
∂t
γJ + (H − V ) γ ∂J
∂t
.
Inserting this expression together with (15) into (16), we get
∂J
∂t∂y
= J
[
(V −H)2 γ
2
λt
µt +
γ3σ2t
2λt
(V −H)3 + γ
2σ2t
2
(V −H) ∂H
∂y
+
γ
λt
∂H
∂t
+ γ
λ′t
λ2t
(V −H)
]
+
γ (H − V )
λt
I (t, y) . (19)
Subtracting (19) from (18), we obtain
0 = −Jγµt ∂H
∂y
+
∂H
∂t
+
1
2
σ2t λ
2
t
∂2H
∂y2
− λt (V −H)
[(
1
λt
)′
+ γσ2t
∂H
∂y
]
+
γ (H − V )
λt
I(t, y)− Iy(t, y).
Also, (15) implies
∂J
∂y
J
=
(H − V ) γ
λt
.
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Hence we have that
J = exp
{
γ
λt
∫ y
0
(H − V ) du
}
c2 (t) =: He (t, y) c2 (t)
Jy =
∂He
∂y
= He
γ
λt
(H − V ) c2 (t) .
and
I (t, y) = c2 (t)
∫
R
(He (t, y + λtu)−He (t, y)− uγHe (H (t, y)− V )) νt (du) .
So,
γ (H (t, y)− V )
λt
I(t, y) = c2 (t)
γ
λt
∫
R
[(H (t, y)− V )He (t, y + λtu)
− (H (t, y)− V )He (t, y)
−uHeγ (H (t, y)− V )2
]
νt (du)
and
Iy (t, y) = c2 (t)
γ
λt
∫
R
[He (t, y + λtu) (H (t, y + λtu)− V )
−He (t, y) (H (t, y)− V )
−uγHe (t, y) (H (t, y)− V )2 + uλtHe (t, y)Hy (t, y)
]
νt (du) .
Therefore,
γ (H − V )
λt
I(t, y)− Iy(t, y) = −c2 (t) γ
λt
∫
R
[He (t, y + λtu) (H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y))
−uλtHe (t, y) ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
]
νt (du) .
Hence, we get the following equation for H. If there is solution (J,H, λ) satis-
fying the HJB Equations, (H,λ) has to satisfy
0 = −He (t, y) c2 (t) γµt ∂H
∂y
+
∂H
∂t
+
1
2
σ2t λ
2
t
∂2H
∂y2
−λt (V −H)
[(
1
λt
)′
+ γσ2t
∂H
∂y
]
−c2 (t) γ
λt
∫
R
[He (t, y + λtu)H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y)He (t, y + λtu)
−uλtHe (t, y) (t, y)] νt (du) . (20)
We remark that the equation differs in two terms from the one in Cho [5]:
the first term is given by the presence of the drift µ and the last term which is
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given because of the jumps. If there are no jumps and drift, a solution can be
found as done in Cho [5].
Suppose that we have drift and diffusion part but that there are no jumps
in the noise traders’ process. The last equation reduces to
0 = −He (t, y) c2 (t) γµt ∂H
∂y
+
∂H
∂t
+
1
2
σ2t λ
2
t
∂2H
∂y2
−λt (V −H)
[(
1
λt
)′
+ γσ2t
∂H
∂y
]
.
Then
He (t, y) c2 (t) γµt
∂H
∂y
+ λt (V −H)
[(
1
λt
)′
+ γσ2t
∂H
∂y
]
cannot depend on V , equivalently, by differentiating with respect to V , we have
He (t, y)
γ
λt
yc2 (t) γµt
∂H
∂y
= λt
[(
1
λt
)′
+ γσ2t
∂H
∂y
]
(21)
where, for µt 6= 0, the right hand side is strictly increasing in V , while the the
left hand side does not depend on it, which is a contradiction. Hence, we can
have a solution only if µt ≡ 0 which implies(
1
λt
)′
+ γσ2t
∂H
∂y
= 0.
Note that this is the same situation as in Cho [5]. With analogous reasoning,
one can show that, allowing jumps and drift only we arrive to a contradiction.
In fact the equation (20) has the form
0 = −He (t, y) c2 (t) γµt ∂H
∂y
+
∂H
∂t
+
−λt (V −H)
(
1
λt
)′
−c2 (t) γ
λt
∫
R
[He (t, y + λtu) (H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y))
−uλtHe (t, y) ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
]
νt (du) ,
therefore,
−He (t, y) c2 (t) γµt ∂H
∂y
− λt (V −H)
(
1
λt
)′
−c2 (t) γ
λt
∫
R
[He (t, y + λtu) (H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y))
−uλtHe (t, y) ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
]
νt (du) ,
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does not depends on V . Then, by differentiation with respect to V , we obtain
0 = He (t, y) c2 (t)
γ2
λt
yµt
∂H
∂y
− λt
(
1
λt
)′
+c2 (t)
γ2
λ2t
∫
R
[(y + λtu)He (t, y + λtu) (H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y))
−uλtyHe (t, y) ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
]
νt (du) .
or equivalently,
λ2t
c2 (t) γ2
(
1
λt
)′
= yHe (t, y)µt
∂H
∂y
+
1
λt
∫
R
[(y + λtu)He (t, y + λtu) [H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y)]
−uλtyHe (t, y) ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
]
νt (du) .
By differentiating again with respect to V , we obtain
0 = y2He (t, y)µt
∂H
∂y
+
1
λt
∫
R
[
(y + λtu)
2
He (t, y + λtu) [H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y)]
−uλty2He (t, y) ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
]
νt (du)
0 = y2µt
∂H
∂y
+
1
λt
∫
R
[
(y + λtu)
2
HE exp {−γV u} [H (t, y + λtu)−H (t, y)]
−uλty2 ∂H
∂y
(t, y)
]
νt (du) ,
where HE denotes exp
{
γ
λt
∫ y+λtu
y
Hdw
}
> 0. So again, we have an equation
with the left hand side is independent of V , but the right hand side is strictly
decreasing in V .
Note that we obtain the same results having only jumps, with the drift part
being zero. So in the risk-averse case we can expect to find a solution to the
existence of an equilibrium only in the case in which the noise trader’s demand
process presents only a diffusion part.
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